The Next Generation C-sUAS Missile project comes as the U.S. and other nations are pursuing lasers, microwaves and other alternatives to kinetic anti-drone weapons, such as missiles and cannon, which are seen as too expensive and in short supply.

The Army wants to quickly develop an “extended-range, quick-response missile to defeat Group 2 and Group 3 small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) threats,” according to the Army’s Sources Sought notice. The deadline is August 20.

The initial specifications are for a missile that can intercept a drone flying at 6 kilometers altitude, at a range of more than 16 kilometers. The ultimate goal is to destroy drones flying 8 kilometers high, at a range of more than 25 kilometers. Missile guidance would be via a radar seeker.

NGCM appears intended as a step up — but still compatible — with the Army’s Coyote C-UAS missile system.

“The Army is looking for NGCM to be produced and integrated into the existing Coyote Launch System to provide extended range, rapid launch time, and reduced time-to-target over current effectors,” the notice said.

The weapon is intended to stop Group 2 and 3 drones. Group 2 drones have a maximum gross takeoff weight of 21 to 55 pounds, fly below 3,500 feet and have a speed of less than 250 knots, according to the Department of Defense’s UAV classification system. This includes models such as Boeing’s ScanEagle. Group 3 drones, such as Insitu’s RQ-21 Blackjack, have a takeoff weight under 1,320 pounds and fly below 18,000 feet at a speed of less than 250 knots.

The NGCM missile should take less than five seconds to leave the launcher after the operator gives the fire command.

“The missile must be compatible with the Coyote Launcher with minimal to no modifications,” the notice said.

In addition, the missile must also fit with existing air defense systems, including the Sentinel A3/A4, LTAMDS and TPQ-53 radars.

The Army envisions the NGCM missile system in two versions. The fixed-site version would be equipped with a variety of sensors. A mobile version would be “mounted on tactical vehicles for employment at the halt and on-the-move, providing a scalable capability at the tactical edge.”

The Army is aiming for Technology Readiness Level 7 — prototype testing in the field — by the end of fiscal 2027. Contractors will need to have 50 missiles ready for operational assessment by the beginning of 2028.

Significantly, the Army desires missiles costing less than $150,000 apiece as part of a bulk purchase of 5,000 missiles. While that’s a bargain compared to a $4 million Patriot air-defense missile, critics may still question the economics: An Iranian Shahed-136 drone costs around $35,000.

That’s one reason for the drive to develop anti-drone lasers that, theoretically, cost only pennies per shot. On the other hand, missiles can function in bad weather that disrupts laser beams.

“The current industrial base has demonstrated significant challenges, including production delays, quality control issues, and critical obsolescence (i.e., diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages) across key engine components,” warned the Air Force’s Request for Information. The deadline is Aug. 28.

“The government will pursue a strategic competition requiring industry to innovate manufacturing and guarantee supply chain resiliency,” the RFI said.

The initiative comes as the Air Force struggles with its jet engines.

For example, F-35 fighter deliveries and upgrades have been delayed by engine issues, with a Government Accountability Office report noting last year that “the engine contractor is still not delivering engines to contract specifications after 20 years of production.”

Meanwhile, B-52 modernization has been stalled in part by engine issues that have raised costs by $3 billion and delayed initial operational capability by 15 months, according to GAO.

In turn, the Air Force is now embarking on a multiyear fighter engine procurement project that envisions more than 180 engines per year by 2034. The RFI specifically cites engines for the F-15EX and F-16.

The RFI promises “five foundational pillars designed to drive a paradigm shift in engine procurement and sustainment,” as the government shifts from “legacy procurement toward incentivizing industry-led technological evolution and capacity expansion.” These include “holding vendors accountable” for delivering new engines that are more capable, reliable and cheaper.

The Air Force will focus “on the total lifecycle cost of the engine, not just the initial purchase price.”

Contractors are also responsible for ensuring reliable supply chains.

“We will implement an acquisition strategy that prioritizes ease of maintenance and establishes a resilient, sustainable supply chain from day one,” the Air Force said. “This effort is designed to solve key fleet-level issues by requiring a newer engine with improved supportability.”

“The result is a streamlined logistics footprint that reduces downtime, lowers the burden on our maintainers, and ensures the continuous flow of parts and support to maximize flightline readiness.”

Ultimately, the question is whether the U.S. defense industrial base can deliver. The Air Force intends to “enforce stringent producibility requirements.”

“We will select a partner capable of scaling production to meet surge requirements, guaranteeing a steady and uninterrupted supply of engines for USAF/FMS [Foreign Military Sales] aircraft (e.g. F-15EX and F-16) programs,” the RFI reads.

Companies responding to the RFI are asked to provide a variety of details, such as a timeline for developing and manufacturing an engine. They should also specify “at what minimum volume your supply chain can justify private capital investments (such as facility expansion, tooling modernization, or advanced automation) and how those investments will structurally lower your long-term unit costs.”

With nations competing to obtain raw materials — and China restricting sales of rare earths — the Air Force wants to be certain manufacturers can find the raw materials they need.

“From your company’s market perspective, what are the primary raw material constraints (e.g., specialized titanium/nickel alloys) or manufacturing process bottlenecks (e.g., advanced casting or forging capacity) that pose the highest risk to scaling up fighter engine production?” the RFI asks.

Ukrainian F-16s have destroyed more than 2,500 Geran and Gerbera one-way attack drones, wrote airpower expert Justin Bronk in an analysis of the Ukraine air war for the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank.

“[The] use of fighters against such drones has consumed an unsustainable number of airframe flying hours and air-to-air missiles … since mid-2024, when the Ukrainian Air Force received its first Western aircraft and trained crews,” the analysis reads.

“Russian industry produces more than 6,000 [one-way attack] drones per month, and fighter aircraft have only a finite number of airframe hours available before they need time consuming deep maintenance cycles to be performed at a factory by expert technicians.”

Ukraine’s fleet currently operates an estimated 39 F-16s, out of about 79 promised by various Western European nations. Ukraine also flies an estimated four Mirage 2000-5 fighters, out of up to 20 promised by France, plus a few Soviet-era Su-27 and MiG-29 fighters.

The F-16s have been a game changer in the Ukraine air war. They enable Ukraine’s small air force to launch stand-off attacks against ground targets using American-made JDAM and French-made AASM Hammer glide bombs. The threat they pose to Russia’s air force became evident earlier this month, when a Ukrainian F-16 reportedly downed an Su-35 over eastern Ukraine.

Ironically, the F-16 has proven such a capable aircraft that it has become a victim of its own success.

“The F-16 fleet has been over-tasked, mostly by C-UAS [counter-drone] interception duties, for which there is almost unlimited demand over time,” Bronk told Defense News.

The root of the dilemmas is that Ukraine is squeezed between multiple aerial threats.

In addition to drone strikes, Russia has launched numerous cruise and ballistic missiles at Ukrainian cities. Russia has become adept at launching massive combined strikes that begin with waves of drones, followed by cruise missiles, such as the Kh-101, and then ballistic missiles, such as the Iskander-M and Kinzhal.

Ukraine has managed to at least partially tame the drone threat by creating dense belts of short-range air defenses, or SHORAD. These SHORAD belts combine short-range anti-aircraft missiles, anti-aircraft guns, mobile machine gun teams and a variety of homegrown interceptor-drones.

The drawback there is maintaining dense SHORAD coverage along the 745-mile front line — plus defending cities in the rear — with short-range weapons.

“What unites all these mobile air defense teams and counter-drone teams is that their equipment and ammunition is relatively cheap and thus their operations are sustainable,” the RUSI analysis noted. “However, they are relatively personnel intensive to deploy at scale and require both force density and geographical depth to be effective.”

These limitations also point to the difficulties NATO would face in creating its own Ukrainian-style SHORAD system.

“NATO cannot replicate the density of SHORAD defenses that Ukraine deploys for C-UAS coverage, due to the huge personnel requirements of doing so on a sustainable basis,” Bronk told Defense News.

However, NATO could invest in radar-guided anti-aircraft guns to protect key installations, such as airbases and headquarters, and develop cheaper drone-killing munitions for aircraft such as the APKWS II rocket.

Nonetheless, this still leaves Russia’s cruise and ballistic missiles, against which SHORAD is largely ineffective.

As with the U.S. and Israel versus Iran’s missiles, Ukraine must carefully manage limited stockpiles of air defense interceptors like the American-made Patriot and the European-made SAMP/T.

Ideally, Ukraine should rely on SHORAD to stop the drones, while reserving its F-16s for other missions, Bronk argues.

“Other systems need to be used wherever possible for [one-way attack] drones so that F-16 capacity can be used to intercept cruise missiles and deliver strike missions,” Bronk explained. “Within the Ukrainian Air Force inventory, it is by far the most efficient asset for this.”

Bronk believes that F-16 stand-off ground attacks could be even more effective — if Ukraine’s high command was less rigid.

“There is potential for the Ukrainian Air Force to have greater effects if squadrons and wings are given more authority to plan strikes themselves rather than being centrally tasked by Army-centric headquarters elements,” he said.

The Defense Department has put out a solicitation for robot boats that are capable of launching small attack drones — with technology mature enough to be deployed to the field within 120 days.

The goal for the Suitable Warfighting Adaptive Payloads, or SWAP-USV, project is to find “mature, market-ready [unmanned surface vessels] fully integrated with two or more mature, market-ready aerial drones to detect, identify, track, and defeat hostile threats,” according to the Defense Innovation Unit solicitation. The call out set a response deadline of Aug. 10.

To make this happen, DIU created a year-long contest backed by $100 million in prize money. DIU wants to “partner with established maritime manufacturers, autonomy developers, sensor manufacturers, and UAS developers to execute a multi-phase Prize Challenge.”

The SWAP-USV project is billed as a solution to a problem that has also plagued missile and drone defense on land: the economics favor the offense.

“The cost-exchange ratio for detecting and neutralizing asymmetric maritime threats in contested environments is heavily skewed in favor of the adversary,” the DIU solicitation states. Nor can the U.S. military continue to rely “on exquisite, multi-million-dollar naval and aviation assets to intercept these inexpensive targets.”

The solicitation paints the picture of a drone boat that can carry, launch and control at least two small UAVs. The UAVs together should be capable of conducting kinetic strikes with a combined payload of at least 2 kilograms, or just over 4 pounds.

DIU wants a mix of recoverable and one-way attack drones that can patrol ocean, coastal and riverine waters, and loiter on station. The drones, according to the solicitation, should “support one or more operational effects, including ISR, comms relay, electronic warfare, payload delivery, or precision engagement of moving or stationary, as applicable, under operator command.”

The Pentagon also wants the system to be mobile enough to fit into a standard cargo container, on road trailers or on C-17 and C-130 transports.

“Solutions that can launch from unimproved locations or provide additional launch flexibility, i.e. remotely from a container, will be looked upon favorably,” DIU noted, adding that the UAVs should be “technically mature and have an established production line.”

Interestingly, among the maritime threats the DIU solicitation cites are “‘go-fast’ smuggling boats, and semi-submersibles.” Drug cartels have used semi-submersibles to transport contraband from South America to the U.S., and such pseudo-submarines are hard to detect.

The SWAP-USV project calls for robot craft capable of “autonomous surveillance and interdiction of defined maritime operating areas, maximizing operational coverage, probability of detection, interdiction effectiveness, and time on station while minimizing daily operating cost, logistics burden, and required personnel.”

The surveillance elements of the solicitation state that the drone boat must be able to “autonomously follow or shadow a vessel of interest, and autonomously intercept a noncooperative, maneuvering vessel. Autonomous execution of these functions is desired but not required.”

The SWAP-USV Challenge, meanwhile, comprises three “sprints,” or phases, each with separate prize money. To sweeten the pot further, companies that pass the test in each phase will be eligible for procurement contracts backed by a $200 million budget.

Sprint 1 calls for in-water testing in fall 2026, with a goal of deploying a system in the field within 120 days.

“Solutions must include a complete mission ready USV with integrated drone capability system available for testing and evaluation within 29 days of down-selection for Sprint 1,” the solicitation specified. There will be $40 million in prize money.

Sprint 2 will have a fall 2026 deadline and in-water testing in early 2027, with the focus on “expanded payloads, upgraded autonomy, and multi-vendor integrations.” The prize money for that timeframe will also be $40 million.

Sprint 3 will take submissions in early 2027, with in-water testing in summer 2027. The goals of this phase will be announced later, but there will be $20 million in prizes.

Companies must specify which phase they want to join. “The government reserves the right to assign applicants to [Sprint] cohorts based on technical and manufacturing maturity,” the solicitation noted.

But this time, the Pentagon is in a hurry. The Iran war has exposed the problem of relying on costly long-range missiles such as the Tomahawk. To remedy that, DoD is putting out a call for long-range, autonomously guided Ground-Based Affordable Mass, or GBAM, weapons that cost less than $250,000 apiece.

The Pentagon also wants the GBAM munitions to be ready for demonstration within three months, and full-scale production within 18 months.

The goal of the GBAM initiative is to supplement expensive smart munitions with “affordable, scalable long-range effects, and “enable commanders to service a broader target set, preserve exquisite munitions for their intended purpose, and sustain operational tempo throughout a prolonged conflict.”

To facilitate that, the Defense Innovation Unit has created the GBAM Challenge. Contestants will pitch ideas in the form of a pitch deck or white paper, with a deadline of Aug. 5.

Winning teams will be invited to a Phase II flight demonstration at a government test site in early November, where they will give a 30-minute presentation — and get a $250,000 cash prize.

The top Phase II contenders may receive up to $5 million “to immediately deliver operational test quantities to units.” They may also be eligible for other funds, including Prototype Other Transaction agreements, follow-on production contracts and Small Business Innovation Research awards.

“In total, the government has budgeted up to $250 million to support prize execution and follow-on transition activities associated with this effort,” DIU pointed out.

However, grabbing that pot of gold will require much work. For starters, the timeline is tight. The Pentagon wants “mature, affordable, long-range precision strike systems that can be demonstrated within 60 to 90 days, certified, and scaled into production within 12 to 18 months.”

DIU doesn’t specify whether GBAM will be a missile or a drone, though it does say GBAM will be “aligned with the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems (DRPM-UxS) mandate to field low-cost autonomous capabilities at scale.”

Either way, the U.S. military wants a “favorable cost-per-effect at operationally relevant ranges while minimizing the logistical, training, and sustainment burden on employing units.” This means a ground-launched weapon with a range of at least 600 nautical miles, and a minimum payload of 35 pounds while ideally allowing for 100 pounds.

It should have automatic target recognition and autonomous terminal guidance, and be “ideally mission-proven” to function in jamming and GPS-denied environments. This includes “Alternative Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) or redundant navigation capabilities suitable for GPS/GNSS-denied operations in maritime and other ‘feature-poor’ environments.”

DIU is also looking for a weapon that doesn’t require any proprietary launch equipment, with “remote and low-signature launch methods strongly preferred.”

Companies should have an “existing production capacity or credible path to producing 100+ systems monthly.” And with a price tag of “cost-per-effect below $500,000 based on system reliability and mission success rate, with a sub-$250,000 all-up flyaway cost at scale.”

In addition to GBAM, the U.S. military is pursuing other strike weapons that don’t cost as much as traditional missiles, and can be mass produced as needed. They include the Family of Affordable Mass Missiles, or FAMM-BAR, program to launch cruise missiles from cargo planes, as well as the Low-Cost Containerized Missiles hypersonic weapons program.

The Navy recently published a Sources Sought notice for a massive, multi-award contract — worth up to $30 billion — for the multi-mission dry dock.

The dock is part of the Navy’s Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program, which aims to modernize the service’s four long-neglected shipyards at Portsmouth, Virginia, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and Kittery, Maine, as well as the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard & Intermediate Maintenance Facility. The contract is for five years plus three one-year options.

“The Multi-Mission Dry Dock is a fully pressure-relieved dry dock capable of accommodating shipyard repair services for the newest Ford-class aircraft carrier, Nimitz-class carriers, and other surface and subsurface ships served by PSNS & IMF,” according to the Sources Sought notice.

The project was spurred by the need to service Ford-class carriers on the West Coast.

“The Navy does not currently have the capacity and capability to perform depot-level maintenance on a Gerald R. Ford-class carrier in the Pacific Northwest,” according to the Navy’s Multi-Mission Dry Dock website.

The capability to even service older carriers is limited at Puget Sound: “The only dry dock on the West Coast able to accommodate a current Nimitz-class aircraft carrier is Dry Dock 6 (DD6), which does not meet seismic resiliency standards and cannot fully accommodate Ford-class carriers,” the site reads.

The multiple-award construction contract, or MACC, includes several task orders that typically range between $2 billion and $6 billion each. However, there may be smaller task orders for early contractor involvement and alternative technical concepts.

“The focus of this MACC will be the construction of a new proposed Multi-Mission Dry Dock at PSNS & IMF, located at Naval Base Kitsap (NBK) Bremerton, Washington,” the Sources Sought notice said. Located within the existing Dry Dock 3 and Piers 6 and 7, the project includes “dry dock drainage, dewatering, and flooding systems; a caisson; roadways and rail networks; portal crane track; access and egress elements; mechanical, electrical, and communications systems; support buildings; and utility routing tunnels. The proposed project also includes demolition of facilities and utilities.”

The Navy expects the first task order to include dredging, as well as work on piers, buildings and utilities. The second task order will see demolition of Dry Dock 3 and construction of the multi-mission dry dock. Task order three will provide infrastructure, such as electrical substations, utility tunnels and building crane rails. Task order four will be for the dock caisson.

Puget Sound has been a fixture for the Navy for more than a century.

It began in 1891, when the Navy bought 190 acres for $10,000 (about $367,000 today) to create Naval Station Puget Sound. The station became a shipyard in 1900 and was the Navy’s only West Coast repair facility until 1941.

“Between 1917 and 1969, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard constructed a total of 85 ships, including the largest vessels on the West Coast,” the Navy said.

The goal is to “identify industry partners capable of providing a Ground-Based Launcher solution to protect United States Air Force assets,” according to a Request for Information submitted by the service. The request has a response deadline of Aug. 6.

The RFI lists requirements that suggest an air defense system that can handle a variety of threats. In addition to intercepting cruise missiles, the Air Force wants missiles that can destroy drones ranging in size from Group 1 (maximum gross takeoff weight of less than 21 pounds) to Group 5 (maximum weight of more than 1,320 pounds).

This would mean a single system that could stop everything from a small kamikaze drone to a giant Global Hawk-sized UAV.

The query comes as U.S. and allied military bases in the Middle East have been struck hard by Iranian drones and missiles.

Iranian weapons destroyed a valuable U.S. E-3 Sentry AWACS, damaged at least five KC-135 tankers at Saudi airbases and devastated multiple air defense radars.

Likewise, Russia and Ukraine have been hammering each other with waves of drones and missiles that overwhelm air defenses and deplete stockpiles of interceptors.

Not surprisingly, the Air Force wants a defense system with plenty of ammunition. Contractors are asked to “outline operational performance metrics, specifically the firing rate across all magazines and the total magazine depth, while demonstrating seamless command and control (C2) system integration for rapid sensor data dissemination and weapons cueing.”

The RFI suggests a desire for a self-contained system that is easily transportable, uses a laser illuminator for fire control and possesses integrated sensing capabilities. The RFI lists 11 “critical baseline attributes” for the Ground-Based Launcher, including cost, transportability, manpower requirements and built-in testing diagnostics for maintenance and safety.

As background, contractors are asked to refer to the 2012 Joint Staff publication JP 3-01, “Countering Air and Missile Threats.”

Even before the Iran War, the defense of Air Force bases spurred debate. Last year, a strategist on the Air Staff argued that the Air Force should stop relying on the Army for primary air defense of airfields.

He warned that expeditionary airbases lack sophisticated systems like the Patriot, and that the Air Force’s own security forces are poorly equipped for air defense.

In addition to problems stemming from both the destroyers and the missiles, the Navy and Army are reportedly not coordinating work on the joint Conventional Prompt Strike missile program. Missile flight testing scheduled for 2025 has been pushed back to 2027.

“Despite recent successes testing the CPS missile, the Navy faces several programmatic challenges associated with developing, delivering, and deploying the CPS missile on the DDG-1000,” warned the Government Accountability Office report. “These challenges include rising costs, schedule delays, reliability issues with DDG-1000 class destroyers, and CPS production challenges, among other things.”

In search of a mission for the DDG-1000 after escalating costs and capability concerns resulted in the program being cut from 32 ships to just three, the Navy decided in 2022 to arm the Zumwalts with CPS boost-glide hypersonic missiles. CPS uses a two-stage booster to loft a high-altitude glider that can hit a target thousands of miles away in 30 minutes or less.

Two Zumwalts have been delivered, and the third is scheduled for 2028. In addition, CPS missiles will arm Virginia-class attack submarines, while the Army uses a land-based version called the Land-Range Hypersonic Weapon.

However, modifications to the destroyers — such as installing hypersonic missiles and vertical launch tubes — has added costs and delays.

One ship, for example, needed “more cabling than was anticipated in the initial project design, as the contractor cut and removed more cabling than planned from the forward part of the ship for CPS missile launch tube installation,” GAO noted.

In addition, “the DDG-1000 class ships have unique systems, such as its radar, combat, and network systems, that are costly and difficult to sustain and maintain,” GAO said.

The Zumwalts suffer from unreliable power systems and difficulty in obtaining spare parts.

Despite some successful flight tests from land facilities, the CPS missile has also run into problems.

The cost of the missiles has risen sharply: a 2020 Navy estimate of $31 billion for 262 missiles has mushroomed into $41 billion for 224 missiles.

“Lockheed Martin, the CPS missile body prime contractor responsible for production integration, faces significant production issues that it must address to build the missiles at anticipated rates and costs,” said GAO.

There have been problems with heat-resistant coatings, substandard parts and insufficient production capacity, with the factory only capable of producing six or seven missiles a year instead of the desired 12.

Building the CPS missile has also proved too complex for some workers.

“According to Navy and Army program officials, the work instructions are largely written as engineering specifications, which the contractor provides to workers who have recently graduated from high school or vocational school,” the GAO report noted. “Navy production oversight officials said that it is unreasonable to expect workers to understand the instructions provided.”

In theory, the Army should have an easier time with its LRHW missile, which mainly differs from CPS in the launcher. Rather than the cold-gas ejection system that pops CPS from a tube before ignition, LRHW uses a hot-launch system.

However, GAO pointed out a concerning lack of coordination between the two services. For example, while the Navy is responsible for production of the missile body, the Army used its own consultant to study how to increase production.

Thus, “the Navy cannot make decisions in isolation since the Army is buying its own missiles and manages key aspects of production,” the report concluded. Without a joint development and procurement strategy, “the Navy and the Army create the potential for both additional delay and inefficient use of taxpayer funds.”

The sea service “is exploring the industrial base’s capacity to deliver highly capable, autonomous platforms optimized for operations from Ford-class and Nimitz-class Nuclear Aircraft Carriers,” according to the RFI. The response deadline has been set for Aug. 13.

The drones the service is targeting, part of the Air Wing of the Future Family of Systems, can be designed as “a single-role platform, a multi-role platform, or a modular FoS [family of systems],” according to the service.

But whatever the solution, the Navy wants the platforms to be capable of performing eight different missions: strikes against surface ships, strikes against land targets, anti-submarine warfare, air-to-air combat against enemy aircraft and missiles, electronic warfare, ISR, aerial refueling, and resupply flights for a naval task force.

The service is soliciting “industry expertise to identify a mix of platforms that can provide affordable mass, risk-tolerant platforms that can perform the above missions to counter current and emerging threats,” the request states.

The RFI lists a few specific requirements, including a minimum 1,000-nautical mile range for strike missions.

Drones must also possess “flight autonomy (e.g., carrier pattern, taxiing) and mission autonomy (e.g., dynamic tasking/retasking, threat evasion, automated aerial refueling) maturity.”

Additionally, they must be compatible with existing Unmanned Carrier Aircraft control systems, according to the RFI.

Significantly, while the RFI mostly focuses on carrier-based drones, the Navy also wants vertical-takeoff UAVs that can operate from other types of vessels, such as destroyers and mobile sea bases.

“The Navy is interested in novel concepts that can operate from any air capable platform in addition to the CVN (e.g., DDG, ESB) using Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL),” the RFI said.

The RFI is indicative of the Navy’s desire to eventually move on from fourth-generation carrier air wings to an air wing composed of fifth- and sixth-generation manned and unmanned aircraft.

The new drones “must demonstrate increased combat effectiveness over current fourth generation platforms at a given spot factor.”

The Air Wing of the Future, as designed, appears to be modeled for an old-fashioned battle of attrition, in which combat is waged by affordable — and expendable — drones rather than a handful of expensive platforms.

Contractors responding to the RFI are asked to “detail how your production approach supports rapid scaling and elasticity in a surge scenario,” and what techniques they will use to “keep unit recurring flyaway (URF) and sustainment costs within sustainable limits.”

Companies should also explain how their proposed designs will minimize maintenance requirements and fit into existing naval supply chains, according to the RFI. Potential manufacturers should also submit “planned capital investments (CAPX) or Internal Research and Development (IRAD) commitments to mature the solution.”

The Air Wing of the Future Family of Systems is part of the Trump administration’s Golden Fleet expansion plan for the Navy.

Existing family-of-system drone projects include the MQ-25A Stingray tanker and the Collaborative Combat Aircraft, or CCA.

Despite a goal of 100,000 rounds per month by October 2025, the Army had only managed to produce 36,000 rounds per month as of March 2026, according to a report published this month by the Department of Defense Inspector General.

Shell production requires first building the projectile at a metal parts factory, followed by packing the shell with explosives at another facility. But this means “projectile metal part production is the limiting factor for reaching the 100,000 round-per-month goal for 155-mm artillery rounds,” the report noted.

The Army has not been able to forge enough metal parts to ramp up production of projectiles. In particular, “at a contractor-owned, contractor-operated facility in Mesquite, Texas, the contractor has been unable to produce any projectile metal parts that meet contract specifications,” the report reads.

After investing $469 million, the Army opened a modular metal parts factory in Mesquite, Texas in 2024. The Universal Artillery Projectile Lines facility — operated by General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems — was supposed to use “modern manufacturing practices, high levels of automation and digital data capture ability” to forge large numbers of large-caliber metal parts for shells, the Army announced at the time.

That optimism proved premature.

Officials at the Army’s Capability Program Executive Ammunition & Energetics, or CPE A&E, “issued the contract and accepted the risk associated with purchasing and adapting unique production equipment which had not been proven to meet U.S. specifications,” the IG report said.

To save time, the Mesquite factory tried to adapt manufacturing lines originally designed to make parts for the M107 155-mm shell — which dates back to 1958 — rather than the newer M795.

CPE A&E “accepted the risk associated with the contractor’s plan to purchase and adapt M107 metal part production equipment to produce a newer variant of the 155-mm projectile metal parts at different specifications,” said the report.

The report noted that some Army officials had concerns regarding an older ammunition plant in Scranton, Pennsylvania, that included “separate ongoing problems with the contractor in terms of responsiveness, equipment maintenance, and timeliness. Those officials expressed concern to the evaluation team that ACC [Army Contracting Command] did not open the contract for the Mesquite facility to competition from other contractors.”

The bottleneck at the Mesquite plant left the Army’s three existing plants in Scranton, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, and Ingersoll, Canada, to try to pick up the slack.

Amid voracious expenditure of 155-mm rounds by Ukraine that depleted U.S. stockpiles, DoD issued a congressionally-mandated plan in 2022 to modernize howitzer ammunition production. DoD’s 2025 National Defense Industrialization Strategy Implementation Plan aimed at churning out 100,000 155-mm shells per month by October 2025.

The Army’s efforts have borne some fruit, with production nearly tripling to 14,000 shells per month to 36,000. By modernizing the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant and creating two new facilities in Kansas and Arkansas, the Army hopes to load, assemble and pack 140,000 155-mm rounds by December 2027.

In the meantime, the IG suggested the Army could get a refund.

The report recommended that the Army review the contract for the Mesquite facility to determine how the money was spent and whether the DoD can recoup any funds and also “determine whether the Mesquite contract was appropriately issued.”