The agreements come as demand for Patriot and THAAD interceptors has increased following conflicts in Iran and Ukraine that strained U.S. missile inventories. They also come days after a Center for Strategic and International Studies analysis estimated the United States had depleted roughly two-thirds of its pre-war Patriot interceptor inventory during the conflict with Iran.

Defense officials said the agreements are intended to support the department’s long-term procurement objective of nearly 14,000 Patriot and THAAD interceptors by providing sustained demand signals to critical suppliers throughout the defense industrial base. The initiative is designed to triple production capacity for Patriot Advanced Capability-3, or PAC-3, Missile Segment Enhancement interceptors and quadruple production capacity for THAAD interceptors.

DoD said it will work directly with key component suppliers instead of relying solely on prime contractors, encouraging investment in advanced tooling, facility modernization and workforce development needed to sustain higher production rates.

“Building the Arsenal of Freedom requires robust, dynamic supply chains at every level of the industrial base,” Michael P. Duffey, under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, said in a statement. “Framework agreements with munition components suppliers like Northrop Grumman are vital to accelerating the tripling of PAC-3 and quadrupling of THAAD interceptor production.”

The agreements establish a second source for Patriot solid rocket motors, expand production of ignition safety devices for PAC-3 interceptors and increase manufacturing capacity for key THAAD structural components, including mid-body shells, muzzle covers and rail car assemblies.

The initiative is part of the Defense Department’s Acquisition Transformation Strategy and was developed in coordination with the Missile Defense Agency, the Munitions Acceleration Council and the Economic Defense Unit to strengthen the resilience of the missile production supply chain.

Using publicly available information on missile expenditures, production rates and estimated U.S. inventories, the Washington-based think tank estimates the U.S. has expended about 65% of its Patriot inventory, leaving fewer than 1,000 interceptors remaining. The analysis also estimates U.S. inventories of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, interceptors have declined by about 38%, leaving an estimated 234 to 278 interceptors.

CSIS concluded the greater strategic risk is not sustaining the current conflict but responding to another high-intensity contingency before Patriot and THAAD inventories can be rebuilt. According to the analysis, depleted inventories could force the U.S. and its coalition partners to accept greater operational risk during air-defense operations by conserving interceptors or prioritizing only the highest-value threats.

Patriot interceptors are among the U.S. military’s primary defenses against ballistic missiles and are used to protect troops, military installations and allied populations from incoming attacks. During the Iran conflict, Patriot and THAAD systems helped defend U.S. forces and partner nations against ballistic missile attacks, although some missiles penetrated air defenses and caused casualties and damage.

In the assessment, CSIS analysts Mark Cancian and Chris Park wrote that U.S. forces expended large quantities of air-defense interceptors during the initial phase of Operation Epic Fury, leaving significantly fewer missiles available as operations resumed.

“There are no good alternatives to Patriot and THAAD for ballistic missile defense,” the duo concluded in their report.

Their findings further detail that rebuilding depleted interceptor inventories will take multiple years, raising readiness concerns for other theaters.

The Pentagon has not publicly confirmed the inventory estimates contained in the CSIS analysis and did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The Army this week awarded Lockheed Martin a contract worth up to $58.6 billion to produce Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement, or PAC-3 MSE, interceptors through fiscal 2032. The multiyear agreement is intended to expand production capacity as demand for the air-defense missile continues to grow.

“It takes several years to produce a missile. If you put money into the system today, you wouldn’t get a missile for three or four years. Sometimes even five,” Cancian told the BBC. “What we’re getting now are missiles that were funded in 2023.”

That production timeline, CSIS said, leaves a near- to medium-term window of risk if the U.S. is forced to respond to another major conflict before interceptor stockpiles are restored.

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby announced on X Tuesday that the Defense Department had “kicked off” the review Hegseth unveiled during the NATO defense ministerial in Brussels on June 18. Hegseth described the effort at the time as “a real review” of America’s force posture and basing in Europe.

Neither Hegseth’s announcement nor Colby’s statement announced troop reductions, unit movements or installation changes as part of the review. The Pentagon also has not said when the review’s recommendations will be released.

The review follows repeated calls by Trump administration officials for European allies to assume greater responsibility for NATO’s conventional defense as the administration reassesses U.S. force posture worldwide.

Hegseth said the review is expected to take up to six months, but it “could be less.” He shared that the review will include input from U.S. European Command as well as consultations with Congress and U.S. allies.

Colby said the review is designed to ensure NATO is “moving fast and irreversibly toward Europe taking primary responsibility for its conventional defense.” He explained the outcome of the review is intended to accelerate NATO’s transition to what he described as “a stronger, more equitable, and sustainable alliance.”

The Pentagon review aims to ensure U.S. force posture in Europe reflects the 2025 National Security Strategy and the 2026 National Defense Strategy. Colby said the department will develop a range of options based on “strategic rigor, a strong empirical baseline, and a clear sense of the geopolitical and military realities.”

Colby also said he looks forward to working closely with Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, on the review. He noted that the Defense Department plans to have “extensive consultations” with European allies, Congress and other parts of the U.S. government throughout the process.