The $6.3 billion contract, which provides two additional option years, will see Raytheon provide the Defense Department with a continuous supply of Standard Missile-3 Block IB interceptors manufactured primarily in Tucson, Arizona and Huntsville, Alabama.

“SM-3 Block IB has proven its relevance in combat and this contract helps ensure we can replenish inventories and keep pace with the evolving threats the U.S. Navy, MDA and their partners face around the world,” Raytheon President Phil Jasper said in a statement.

The SM-3 Block IB interceptor belongs to a larger family of “hit-to-kill” SM-3 missile interceptors, which seek and destroy incoming ballistic missiles using sheer speed and momentum.

The Block IB type can be used by land forces and ships and is frequently deployed on vessels due to its range and highly flexible steering. The interceptor tracks flying targets with a two-color infrared seeker and propels itself towards them in short bursts, giving it accuracy at high speed as it homes in on targets.

It is designed to knock short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles out of the sky when they are halfway to hitting their targets, and has long striking reach. It was used in combat for the first time in 2024 when the U.S. Navy destroyers USS Arleigh Burke and USS Carney fired them to intercept Iranian missiles aimed at targets in Israel.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies named the SM-3 Block IB among “seven critical munitions” in an April report detailing ammunition shortages, alongside Patriot missiles, Precision Strike Missiles, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles, Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles and others.

The contract for more SM-3 Block IBs, announced by Raytheon on Thursday, was among five framework agreements the defense giant signed with the Pentagon this February.

The deal comes at a time when the DoD is seeking to avert diminishing munitions stockpiles. National security specialists, defense analysts and foreign policy pundits cautioned in March that the U.S. military’s increased use of missile interceptors during the war with Iran poses strategic risks to integral defense capabilities if fighting spills into a long-term conflict.

Raytheon stated in its release that the contract for SM-3 Block IB supply “supports urgent replenishment of missile defense inventory that has been successfully used in combat and remains central to protecting U.S. forces, allies and critical infrastructure.”

As part of its international expansion plans, the company is promoting its unmanned solutions at this year’s AUSA conference in Washington as it seeks to strengthen its presence in the United States.

The company is pushing the project as numerous anti-drone system producers in Ukraine and other European countries are striving to make their interceptors cheaper than the targets they are meant to strike, and also suitable for mass production using readily available components.

Ranno Pajuri, business development manager at KrattWorks, told Defense News the new dummy drone is expected to be presented by the end of 2027.

“We need to obtain a working prototype that is reliable enough. The good thing is that we have software which can be adapted to different hardware quite easily,” he said. “But if the drone becomes so much different from what we have today and so much faster, then there are many variables to consider before it is stabilized and ready for a demonstration.”

The Ukrainian Army, to which the Estonian company has supplied one-way attack drones as well as other products such as its Ghost Dragon ISR drone, is one of the potential users of the new solution. KrattWorks has delivered its UAVs to customers in Europe, and the company is currently making efforts to boost its foothold in the United States as well as various markets in Asia and Africa. KrattWorks says its Ghost Dragon ISR systems have also been deployed in Estonia, Georgia and Moldova, among others.

“We produce our drones in Estonia. We have enough extra capacity to ramp up the production if the demand will grow. Aerial target drones are usually made within quite a short lead time,” Pajuri said. “But we are open to some level of transfer of production if this is necessary and the demand is large enough in the country to which we are selling our products.”

KrattWorks says its product portfolio includes the DART fixed-wing aerial target, which is intended for use against air-defense missiles, heavy machine guns and anti-aircraft cannons, and the DART-R, an aerial target decoy fitted with a radar reflector that can reach a maximum speed of 200 km/h (124 mph), according to data from the company. KrattWorks also makes the PARM aerial target quadcopter.

The manufacturer said it “builds ISR drones with wide frequency band-hopping radios and GNSS-free flight modes to help first responders and servicemen to gain fast situational awareness in situations where every second counts.”

The business cooperates closely with the Ukrainian Armed Forces and studies the UAV attacks that take place in Ukraine and the evolving tactics used there to improve its products. KrattWorks makes efforts to ensure that its aerial target drones mimic the latest operational trends and act in a realistic manner, the company representative said.

In its September 2026 report on Russia’s use of UAVs against Ukraine, the Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington-based think tank, said the Russian military used an estimated 5,166 Shahed-type drones, including decoys, against Ukrainian targets in August alone.

Meanwhile, the Office of the President of Ukraine said on Sept. 28 that the country’s military had reached an overall drone shoot-down rate of 70%, including both piston-powered and jet-powered Shaheds.

“But for jet-powered ‘Shaheds,’ unfortunately, the rate is much lower than it needs to be – 57%,” the office said in a statement. “New interceptors are being actively tested. Some combat teams are already using them, but of course, some details still need to be refined to ensure sufficient effectiveness and deployment at scale. We are pushing the developers to move faster.”

President Trump’s February 2025 executive order, “The Iron Dome for America” (later rebranded as Golden Dome), directed the Department of Defense to protect U.S. citizens and infrastructure from all forms of aerial attack. The department took a first step toward assigning responsibility for a U.S. air and missile defense architecture by standing up the Golden Dome office. But critical elements of any near-term defensive shield remain outside its control: namely, the U.S. air and missile defense systems that have proven their worth on Ukrainian and Middle Eastern battlefields.

The Aegis system, for example, is a U.S. Navy program—though its ballistic missile defense component is funded by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Patriot interceptors, in turn, belong to the Army. Theater High Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD) batteries and the Ground Based Midcourse Defense System (GMDS) are developed by the MDA but operated and maintained by the Army. U.S. Northern Command is responsible for U.S. air surveillance but relies heavily on radars belonging to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) — and so on.

The Golden Dome director’s position in the Defense Department hierarchy — reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense — reflects the urgency of the task. But it does not convey any actual authority to direct the decisions of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Transportation secretaries.

Diffusion of responsibility is a recipe for failure.

For Golden Dome to work, the Defense Department must draw on lessons from some of its most successful Cold War innovations — specifically, the organizational innovations that made its game-changing technologies and operational concepts possible. Admiral Hyman Rickover, perhaps the leading exemplar of Cold War innovation, took nuclear propulsion from the blackboard to the fleet in just five years.

To quote Rickover: “Unless you can point your finger at the one person who is responsible when something goes wrong, then you have never had anyone really responsible.” Golden Dome fails this test, precisely because — according to the Defense Department itself — it is a “team effort” in which “we’re going to need all the services and agencies that do this kind of work to step up.”

Rickover took the opposite approach. If something was critical to the Navy’s nuclear propulsion program, he established de facto (and often de jure) control over it. For example, he successfully co-opted the Cabinet-level Atomic Energy Commission. Established in 1947 to oversee all U.S. nuclear matters, the AEC was a potential bureaucratic roadblock. At Rickover’s prompting, therefore, the Navy issued him orders to “report for duty with the Division of Reactor Development” in the AEC (and to the Navy for “additional duty”).

With one foot in the Navy and the other in the AEC, Rickover became the central U.S. authority for nuclear propulsion. This allowed him to coordinate the activities of two separate executive departments, often by proposing an action from one department and then convincing the other to approve it. His dual office, Naval Reactors, remains part of both the Navy and the Department of Energy (successor to the AEC) to this day.

The Rickover approach is not how the Pentagon normally does business. “I can assure you,” Rickover told Congress in 1979, “that having one individual responsible for a total program is a unique concept within the Department of Defense.” But Rickover made it his business to acquire unchallenged authority over all areas that concerned “his” reactors.

The Secretary of Defense must likewise assign total responsibility for Golden Dome, with autonomy and authority to match. This will entail taking the requisite authorities from their normal stewards and re-delegating them to the Golden Dome director.

For example, ballistic missile defense responsibility is currently bifurcated between Golden Dome and the Missile Defense Agency. MDA should be moved under Golden Dome. Similarly, airspace surveillance operations and modernization are divided between DoD and the FAA, with the latter contributing the lion’s share. The Golden Dome director must have a Rickover-like dual assignment in the FAA. And if homeland defense is indeed an urgent priority, DoD should take a hard look at whether the Aegis and Patriot programs should be moved under Golden Dome as well.

This process will be challenging, but far from impossible. And while Rickover’s nuclear power program is one of the most remarkable Cold War innovations, other success stories such as General Bernard Schriever’s Atlas ICBM and Undersecretary of Defense William Perry’s F-117 stealth fighter applied the same core insight: comprehensive organizational authority is just as important as any technological or industrial-base factor. DoD must heed this lesson if Golden Dome is to succeed.

Thane Clare is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Israel’s defense ministry said it was Israel’s largest-ever defense export deal with Greece and one of the biggest in the country’s history. The agreement confirmed an earlier Reuters report.

Amir Baram, director-general of Israel’s defense ministry, said the so-called Achilles Shield deal reflected “Israel’s technological edge and the proven track record of our defense systems in the field.”

Under the deal, Israel will supply Greece with the David’s Sling and SPYDER systems produced by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and the BARAK MX system made by Israel Aerospace Industries, as well as MMR multi-mission radars for air surveillance, manufactured by IAI unit ELTA Systems.

David’s Sling was used by Israel to intercept Iranian missiles during the war with Iran this year. Greece becomes the second customer for the system after Finland.

Greece spends nearly 3.5% of its gross domestic product on defense, a higher proportion than many NATO allies due to its long-standing dispute with neighboring Turkey.

Athens plans to spend about €28 billion by 2036 to build the Achilles Shield multi-layer anti-ballistic, anti-aircraft and anti-drone system, and to buy up to 40 F-35 fighter jets from the U.S. and frigates from France and Italy.

Under Monday’s deal, Greece will also receive a new national command-and-control system, developed by Rafael, to integrate the country’s air-defense capabilities.

A supplementary €26 million agreement will see Israel supply Greece with Rafael’s Drone Dome systems to protect strategic sites against drones and reinforce existing defenses.

Israel will also expand defense-industrial cooperation with Greece, including transfers of technology and expertise to local industry.

The requested appropriation funds include 250 million francs earmarked for down payments on short-range ground-based air defense systems and 650 million francs for medium-range systems, as well as 60 million francs for a medium-range radar and 10 million for drone-counter systems, the Swiss federal council said in a statement on Wednesday.

The advance payments are intended to ensure deliveries take place on time and allow training of operational procedures to begin, the government said. Switzerland plans to spend 1 billion francs on Diehl’s IRIS-T SLM for medium-range air defense as well as 800 million francs to buy the Oerlikon Skynex short-range system from Rheinmetall, according to the 2026 defense-equipment program.

“Hybrid operations and attacks from a distance pose the most likely threats to Switzerland,” the federal council said. “At the same time, the armed forces lack the necessary resources to adequately protect Switzerland from aerial threats.”

The tight international arms markets with “sharply” higher demand means production capacities are fully booked for years to come, with delivery times lengthening, according to the government. Arms makers also increasingly demand “substantial” down payments, and failure to meet those demands could delay urgent procurements by several years, the government said.

Switzerland said in March the country was considering buying a second long-range air-defense system, as delivery of previously ordered Patriot systems from the United States looked to be delayed by four to five years. The country said in June it would start negotiations with French, Israeli and South Korean manufacturers.

The French-Italian SAMP/T NG system produced by Eurosam and armed with MBDA’s Aster air-defense interceptor is considered the favorite for the second long-range system, SRF Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen reported in June.

With the supplementary appropriation, the council “aims to secure production capacity and delivery dates at an early stage for the procurements approved” in the 2026 armed forces budget. The council said the financing is possible thanks to an improved fiscal outlook resulting from higher income tax revenues.

The council said it will be able to proceed with the advance payments as soon as parliament has made its decision, probably during the upcoming fall session.

The government additionally plans to invest 100 million francs in coming years to strengthen security at more than 60 military sites, including improved fencing, video surveillance, electronic access controls, and secure rooms.

The evolving security situation means “it is urgent to implement these measures quickly,” by early 2029 at the latest, and a decision next year would be too late to achieve that goal, the council said.

The Washington Post reported in March that the Pentagon was moving parts of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the Middle East from South Korea, citing two officials.

The U.S.-made THAAD system is used for high-altitude interception of ballistic missiles and it was deployed in South Korea to guard against nuclear-armed North Korea.

The commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, Gen. Xavier Brunson, was asked at a Senate committee hearing by Democratic Senator Gary Peters about South Korean concerns that moving THAAD weakened deterrence against North Korea.

“We have not moved any THAAD systems, so THAAD still remains on the peninsula currently, but we are sending munitions forward, and those are sitting right now waiting to move,” Brunson said.

“So there were previous moves, where radars were taken forward. This was in advance of Midnight Hammer,” he said referring to U.S. attacks on Iran last June.

“Some of those things have not come back yet, but the THAAD systems themselves … remain on peninsula,” he said, adding that he expected them to remain there.

“We moved them around. I think that’s what got into the information space,” Brunson said.

“I was dynamically moving those around, so that I could then sequence them into Osan Air Base to prepare them to move the munitions and that caused a big kerfuffle on the peninsula,” he said, referring to one of the two main U.S. air bases in South Korea.

After the reports of the movements in March, South Korea’s President Lee Jae Myung said Seoul could deter any threats from North Korea even if Washington redeploys weapons from the peninsula.

Though the Department of Defense does not divulge the precise number of Tomahawks in the U.S. arsenal, the CSIS analysis estimates the U.S. still has around 3,000. It is a highly advanced weapon; in addition to its impressive 1,000-mile range and precision, it can also be controlled via satellite and can find a target while in flight.

As Cancian told Military Times, the concern from some in the Pentagon about burning through the Tomahawk stockpile is less about what will happen in Operation Epic Fury, and more about U.S. security commitments in other parts of the world — namely as a counter to China.

The below interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Military Times: Let’s talk first about what the Tomahawk does — how it’s launched, the mechanics of its use in this conflict and why it’s so important.

Mark Cancian: Tomahawk is a ship-launched ground attack missile. It’s very long range and very accurate. It’s been around for a long time, but it’s been upgraded continuously over time, and now the Block V is the current version. Its long range and accuracy have always been its great strength. Plus, the fact that it can be launched from sea means that you can move ships around and launch it. You don’t have to have aircraft coming from the United States, and you don’t have to have a base in the region.

They’re very flexible, and the fact that they’re long range means that if the opposition has some defensive capabilities, [U.S. forces] can stay out of those defensive capabilities. That’s why it was used in the early stages of Epic Fury, until the United States and Israel had beaten down what was left of the Iranian air defense system.

Once we established air superiority, the number of Tomahawks fired declined. It didn’t go to zero, but it came down because they’re so expensive and scarce that if we can use shorter range munition, then we’ll use that because those are much cheaper. To give you a little sense about that, a Tomahawk costs something like $3.5 million apiece and has a range of 1,000 miles, depending on the version.

A JDAM, which is a guidance kit put on a dumb bomb, has a range of maybe 20 miles, but cost $80,000 and has the same explosive effect and the same accuracy. So if you can use a JDAM, much better, but that means you have to get close.

MT: What does this do for weapons capabilities in other theaters, especially those with U.S. involvement?

Cancian: This is the key concern with the inventories because we have enough of everything, including Tomahawks and Patriots and THAADs to fight the current conflict, that is, Epic Fury. The problem is the effect on other theaters like Ukraine and the Western Pacific, a conflict against China. And strategists are very worried that depletion of inventories will weaken our ability to deter or to fight a conflict there.

MT: What role does the Tomahawk play in deterrence?

Cancian: With China particularly focused on Taiwan it’s very helpful because China has a tremendous number of missiles. We want to stand back as far as we can, but still be able to shoot in against any Chinese invasion force or any Chinese force that has established itself on Taiwan.

I should note that there’s what’s called a maritime strike Tomahawk, which is the relatively new version that could hit ships. The original version could only hit ground targets, but this other version can hit ships and [in the event of a] Chinese invasion of Taiwan, that would be very helpful.

MT: What is the level of damage that this munition can do? And where have we seen that in Operation Epic Fury?

Cancian: It does a lot of damage — it has a 1,000-pound warhead. The drones that we’ve used and that the Iranians have used, they have warheads that are between 50 and 100 pounds. So it’s somewhere between 10 to 20 times the effect of a drone. Whatever it hits, it’s going to cause a lot more destruction.

MT: How long will it take for the U.S. to recuperate its stockpile, and what does that entail?

Cancian: The Department of Defense has been talking with [defense contractors] for several years to get production rates up. It began in the Biden administration. It’s continued in the Trump administration. Hegseth has been going on this Arsenal of Freedom tour, plant to plant, to talk to workers and management about speeding up production. Bottom line, I think currently, to replace the 850 to 1,000 that we’ve expended, you’re talking two or three years.

MT: If we’re firing fewer Tomahawks how does that shift the strategy?

Cancian: It doesn’t shift the strategy. But what it does mean is that we don’t have to use these very expensive and scarce missiles as much, but can use the much less expensive short range munitions. That means we can keep the fighting going much longer, in fact, essentially indefinitely. And although we put a big dent in the inventories, you know, we’re not going to go down to zero Patriot and Tomahawks.

MT: There’s also been a very significant use of the Patriot system in the Gulf. Do you have concerns there about our ability to protect U.S. installations, or to assist our allies with those kinds of defenses?

Cancian: Right now, we have enough Patriots to defend in the Gulf against the Iranian ballistic missile attacks, and that’s what the Patriots do. They’re not used against drones. We estimated there were about 4,000 [Patriot missiles] at the beginning of the war. We’ve maybe used 1,000 now, so we’ve used a quarter, which is, on the one hand a lot. On the other hand, that means you still have three-quarters left.

But again, you have this strategic problem, and you have the same problem about rebuilding the inventories. We’re producing [about] 600 Patriots a year. About half of those go to the United States, and half go to allies, and that’s going to continue. I wouldn’t be surprised if there were some discussions about maybe reallocating some of that production to other countries, shifting people around in the queue so that maybe the Gulf states would get up to the front, and maybe some others would be moved back.

Within weeks of each other, the two largest U.S. commercial space companies abruptly shifted their priorities toward lunar development. The moves came as the Department of Defense accelerates plans for a next-generation missile shield known as the Golden Dome, raising questions about whether America’s return to the moon is as much about defense as it is exploration.

In early February, SpaceX announced it would redirect plans for a future city on Mars to establishing one on the moon. The reversal was striking, as Musk previously insisted Mars was the only meaningful destination.

Just days prior to this announcement, Blue Origin quietly paused its New Shepard tourism program for at least two years to increase focus on lunar development, framing the move as part of the nation’s goal of returning to the moon.

However, the timing may suggest a more strategic approach.

In December 2025, the White House issued an executive order calling for a missile shield prototype by 2028, critical for the Golden Dome initiative.

This order also set a timeline for an American lunar return by 2028, with elements of a permanent moon presence targeted for 2030.

Defense officials, such as Space Force Vice Chief of Operations Gen. Shawn Bratton, have emphasized that commercial partnerships will be essential to achieving these goals.

SpaceX is reportedly in line for a $2 billion Pentagon contract to build a 600-satellite constellation supporting Golden Dome tracking and targeting, though the award has not been formally confirmed.

The project would rely on low Earth orbit satellites capable of rapid, near-real-time missile detection. Such systems improve coverage, but remain vulnerable to anti-satellite attacks from adversaries.

The company’s shift to the moon could change that equation. Lunar-based infrastructure would sit far beyond the reach of most anti-satellite capabilities, offering more resilient communications and sensing layers.

In this scenario, the moon could become a strategic “high ground,” which could offer the Pentagon a more durable and far-reaching view for missile detection and surveillance.

Just 15 days before Blue Origin announced its shift toward the moon, the Missile Defense Agency added the company to its $151 billion SHIELD contract, a Pentagon program allowing firms to compete for Golden Dome-related work.

While no specific awards are guaranteed, the timing is noteworthy. Blue Origin is now putting lunar logistics front and center, pausing the New Shepard program to focus resources on that effort.

The company’s Blue Ring vehicle is designed for orbital maneuvering and refueling, capabilities that could one day support sensor deployment and flexible positioning beyond Earth’s orbit, where they are less vulnerable to attack and can provide broader global coverage.

Meanwhile, its Blue Moon MK1 and MK2 landers can deliver multi-ton payloads to the lunar surface, which could be enough to deploy communications systems, sensors or other infrastructure to remote locations, potentially supporting Golden Dome-like operations.

Taken together, these developments could suggest a broader transformation in the strategic landscape of space, one that increasingly intersects with homeland defense and global security.